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Publicity and Privacy-Distinct Interests on the
Misappropriation Continuum
Larry L. Saret*
Martin L. Stern**
If a man builds a better mousetrap than his neighbor, the world
will not only beat a path to his door, it will make newsreels of
him and his wife in beach pajamas, it will discuss his diet and his
health, it will publish heart throb stories of his love life, it will
publicize him, analyze him, photograph him, and make his life
thoroughly miserable by feeding to the palpitant public intimate
details of things that are none of its damned business.1
Although many famous people would agree with the above statement, others seek publicity to gain recognition from the "palpitant
public." Both types of famous persons have recently asserted a
"right of publicity" to protect themselves and their interests from
unauthorized and intrusive exploitation. The right of publicity is a
relatively new term which defines rights in a person's name or likeness. Only a handful of courts have expressly recognized or even
considered the existence of this right. The right of publicity, however, is certain to become a subject of frequent litigation. Modern
electronic and print media have enormous capability to catapult an
individual into the glare of the public eye. Businesses, particularly
merchandisers, have achieved great commercial success by linking
their products with the publicity generated by and about certain
individuals.2 As a result, commercial value has become attached to
these names and likenesses. The use and misuse of these valuable
rights inevitably results in litigation.
As with most new common law rights, substantial confusion exists concerning the source of, and the limitations upon, the right of
© 1981 L. Saret and M. Stern
* Partner, Laff, Whitesel, Conte & Saret, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. Cornell University, 1972;
J.D. Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, 1975.
** Associate, Laff, Whitesel, Conte & Saret, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. Illinois Institute of
Technology, 1974; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1977.
1. Levy, The Right To Be Let Alone, American Mercury (June 1935).
2. For example, everyone is aware of Reggie Jackson, the baseball player, as well as
Reggie Jackson candy bars, athletic equipment, posters, and the like.
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publicity. This confusion is the result of inconsistent judicial development in various states. The disagreement in judicial interpretation diminishes the value of the right of publicity to the interstate business or merchandiser.
This article will appraise the current status of the law on the
right of publicity, focusing particularly on how various jurisdictions have characterized the source of the right and the implications of recognition of a particular source for defining the right.
The initial determination of the source of the right of publicity not
only affects whether the right is enforceable, but also has significant repercussions for the future development of the evolving right
of publicity. In order to illustrate the potential implications of
adopting a particular theory behind this right, Illinois will be used
as a representative example of a jurisdiction which has not yet recognized the right to demonstrate how the right could originate in
that jurisdiction. Finally, the distinction between the right of publicity and the right of privacy will be explored.
DERIVATION AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Jurisdictions recognizing a right of publicity have derived the
right from two distinct sources. Several jurisdictions have characterized the right as a property interest in a name or likeness that
exists independent of the personal right of privacy. In contrast,
other jurisdictions have viewed the protection of a name or likeness purely as an outgrowth of the right of privacy and treat the
right strictly as a personal right. To fully appreciate the significance of this distinction, it is necessary to examine how courts
have utilized each source as a basis for the right of publicity.
The Right of Publicity as a Property Right
Recognition of the right of publicity as a property right is consistent with accepted theories of misappropriation, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition that have evolved from the seminal
case of InternationalNews Service v. The Associated Press.' In
that case, International News Service engaged in wholesale misappropriation of news acquired by its competitor, the Associated
Press. 4 The United States Supreme Court found that, although not

3. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
4. Associated Press complained that: (1) International News Service bribed employees of
Associated Press newspapers to obtain Associated Press news before it was published; (2)
induced Associated Press members to violate the by-laws of the Associated Press and give

1981]

Publicity and Privacy

protected by copyright, a protectible property interest existed in
the news gathered by the Associated Press by virtue of the "expenditure of labor, skill and money. ' The Court characterized the defendant's conduct as an effort to "reap where it had not sown."'
The Court affirmed the injunction granted in favor of the plaintiff,
as justified by the principle "that he who has fairly paid the price
should have the beneficial use of the property."
The theory of misappropriation and the underlying equitable
principles expressed in InternationalNews Service have been applied by state' and federal9 courts in a number of situations involving intellectual property. The gist of these cases is that through
the expenditure of money, time and effort, "property" is created
having widespread public recognition, and that recognition is entitled to protection against misappropriation.1" The same concept
provides a basis for the right of publicity. Indeed, several courts
have attributed the source of the right of publicity to a property
interest independent of related personal privacy rights."

news to International News before publication; and (3) copied Associated Press news from
bulletin boards and early editions of Associated Press newspapers. Only the third form of
misappropriation was at issue before the Supreme Court. 248 U.S. 231-32.
5. Id. at 239. The Court called the property interest "quasi-property." Id. at 236.
6. Id. at 239.
7. Id. at 240.
8. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Ill.
App. 3d 820, 327 N.E.2d 247 (1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264
N.E.2d 874 (1970); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artist Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q.
(B.N.A.) 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.
36, 144 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
9. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); Chemical
Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962); Lone Ranger, Inc. v.
Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1935), rev'd on other grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v.
Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc.
v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp.
490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
10. "Full and fair competition requires that those who invest time, money and energy
into the development of goodwill and a favorable reputation be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment." Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215
(8th Cir. 1976).
11. Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v.
Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836
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The earliest case expressly recognizing and enforcing a right of
publicity is Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc. 2 There, the plaintiff was a chewing-gum manufacturer which
had purchased the exclusive right to use a baseball player's photograph to sell gum. The defendant, a competitor of the plaintiff,
subsequently obtained contracts for the same right from the same
ball player. The Second Circuit' held that the plaintiff did not possess and could not claim a violation of the right of privacy under
New York statutes,1" since that right was personal and non-assignable from the ball player. Nevertheless, the court recognized an alternative basis for liability: "We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph. . .. This right might be called a
'right of publicity.'""
The right of publicity was also considered a property right in
15
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corporation.
There, the
plaintiff was a professional boxer who sold the motion picture
rights of +his bout with Joe Louis. Unauthorized film of the bout
was taken without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent. Subsequently, this unauthorized film, which contained some objectionable editing, appeared on television. The plaintiff's suit against the
television broadcaster, the sponsor of the program, and the advertising agency, was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a
claim.16
On appeal, the Third Circuit characterized the state of the law
applicable to the plaintiff's claim as "a haystack in a hurricane.' '
The court attempted to clarify the law by examining the underly-

(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
12. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
13. The right of privacy is statutorily defined in New York. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51.
14. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The court relied on several New York decisions,
including Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), and Madison
Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures, 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 845 (1938). In
Wood, the court recognized the value of the endorsement of a well-known fashion designer,
which was the subject of the contract at issue. In Madison Square Garden Corp., the court
held that defendants' portrayal in motion pictures of the likenesses of members of the New
York Rangers professional hockey team in uniform and apparently within plaintiff's famous
building constituted, in part, misappropriation of plaintiff's property rights. In both cases
the court recognized a value or property right in a name or likeness apart from any right of
privacy.
15. 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
16. Id. at 484.
17. Id. at 485.
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ing rationale for the right. First, the court stated, "[t]here are...
two polar types of cases. One arises when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity surrounding an average person
and makes him, arguably, newsworthy. The other type involves the
appropriation of the performance or production of a professional
performer or entrepreneur." 8 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that where a "professional performer is involved, there seems to be
a recognition of a kind of property right in the performer to the
product of his services."' The court then inquired whether such a
right was recognized by the relevant jurisdictions in this diversity
case. Finding that Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and New
York all would recognize a property right of some sort and would
grant relief under the theory of unfair competition,20 the court held
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action.2"
The distinction between the source of privacy and publicity
rights once again was critical in Uhlaender v. Henricksen.2 Major
league baseball players and their licensing agent sought injunctive
relief against manufacturers of parlor games. The defendants had
used the plaintiffs' names and publicly disseminated statistical information about the plaintiffs23 in connection with their games.
The defendants argued that because this information was publicly
broadcast and in the public domain, plaintiffs had waived their
right to compensation, and, therefore, to any judicial relief.2" Acknowledging that such an argument "may or may not have some
weight against a right of privacy claim,"2 the court nevertheless
rejected the argument2 6 on the ground that the rights in issue were
commercially valuable precisely because of public dissemination
and recognition.2 The court held that plaintiffs had an enforceable

18. Id. at 486. The distinction between the two types of cases was an important element
of the court's decision. Had a property right not been found, relief would have been denied.
As noted in the dissenting opinion, the critical test for finding liability under the laws of
privacy was not met since defendants' use of plaintiff's name and likeness was not one that
would ordinarily be considered offensive to a reasonable person's sensibilities. Id. at 496
(Hastie, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 487.
20. Id. at 495.
21. Id. at 496.
22. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
23. Data such as the player's batting, fielding and earned run averages were utilized by
defendants.
24. 316 F. Supp. 1282-83.
25. Id. at 1283.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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right for injunctive relief, for which "the basis and underlying theory is that a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own
industry free from unjustified interference."28
The Right of Publicity as a Personal Right
An alternative source for the right of publicity is the right of
privacy.2 9 The right of privacy, or "right to be let alone," encompasses a range of recognized causes of action. Dean Prosser classified invasions of the right of privacy into four categories: (1) intrusion upon physical solitude; (2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) publicity placing a party in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit.3 0 It is the
fourth category which has provided a basis for the recognition of
the right of publicity in some jurisdictions.
An example of a case reflecting Prosser's theory is Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.5 1 The Ohio Supreme Court in
that case considered a claim for invasion of privacy brought by an
entertainer at a county fair against the owners of a television station. The defendant had taped the plaintiff's complete perform-

28. Id. at 1282. Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized a value or property right in
a name or likeness existing independently and evolving separately from the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift and Company, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969). These decisions seem
to implicitly recognize "[t]he rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right."
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
29. The concept of the right of privacy was first best articulated in the classic article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, published in 1890, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis urged that there exists in the law
a broad principle of a "right to life" upon which enforcement of the "right of an individual
to be let alone" can be premised. Invasion of this right, it was argued, constitutes a legal
injury. Although Warren and Brandeis were apparently most concerned with the unauthorized publication of private facts by the press and intrusions of the press into an individual's
life, the right of privacy as recognized today encompasses more than just the disclosure of
private facts. The "privacy" seed planted by Warren and Brandeis has grown to include
several different causes of action and is now recognized in the vast majority of jusisdictions
either under common law or by statute. See note 77 infra. As Dean Prosser has noted, "no
other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its bare existence."
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802-3 (4th ed. 1971)[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
30. Id. at 804-814; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A (1976).
As it has appeared in the cases thus far decided, it is not one tort, but a complex
of four. To date the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common
name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents
an interference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone'.
PROSSER, supra note 29, at 804.
31. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976).
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ance as a "human cannonball" and then broadcast the tape during
a newscast. Relying on Ohio right of privacy cases and the Second
Restatement of Torts, 2 the court determined that the plaintiff's
claim was for "invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation."38
The court did not consider it anomalous that the plaintiff performed his act before large crowds yet sought to protect his privacy. To the contrary, the court recognized that the right sought to
be protected was "personal control over a commercial display and
exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents ....
[Another court] has aptly called this aspect of privacy 'the right of
publicity.' -13

The Ohio Supreme Court held that despite the plaintiff's right
of publicity, the defendants were constitutionally privileged under
the first amendment to film and televise the plaintiff's act because
the act was a matter of legitimate public interest. 5 This holding
was reversed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court. 6 The
Supreme Court, perhaps recharacterizing the nature and derivation of plaintiff's claim, stated that "the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of
the individual in his act.

'3

7

The Court stressed that protection of

this proprietary interest provides an economic incentive to produce
a performance of interest to the public. 8 The Court concluded
that the first and fourteenth amendments do not grant a privilege
to the media to impinge upon this interest by broadcasting a performer's entire act without his consent.3 9
The right of publicity also was treated as a personal right in
Memphis Development, Etc. v. Factors Etc., Inc." In that case,
the name and likeness of Elvis Presley were used by the defendant
on a large statue and miniature pewter replicas. Although Presley
had licensed use of his name and likeness to others during his life32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967) provides that,
"one who appropriates . . . the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy."
33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454,
456 (1976).
34. Id. at 459.
35. Id. at 462.
36. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
37. Id. at 573.
38. Id. The protection of a proprietary interest as an economic incentive to produce is
similar to that of the patent and copyright laws.
39. Id. at 575.
40. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

time, the defendant's unauthorized use occurred after Presley's
death.'
The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce a right of publicity on behalf of Presley's assignee, holding that Presley's death extinguished the right.42 The court appeared to reject cases construing
the right of publicity as a property right.4 3 Instead, the court de4
termined that the "law of defamation . . . provides an analogy."'
The opinion extensively focused on unsettled issues surrounding
the right of publicity, such as the potential conflict between the
right with the first amendment, and the undetermined temporal
scope of the right.48 The court viewed these problems as the consequences of extending recognition of the right of publicity beyond
death of the principal.46 In essence, the court was concerned that a
decision in the plaintiff's favor would likely spur future litigation,
and that survival of the right "is contrary to our legal tradition and
somehow seems contrary to the moral presuppositions of our
7
culture."'

4

41. Id. at 957.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 958.
44. Id. at 959.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also text accompanying note 89 supra.
47. Id. The Court's reasoning, however, is squarely in conflict with the Second Circuit's
first opinion in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979). In that case the court enforced a claim under New York law based on
Presley's right of publicity asserted after his death. See text accompanying notes 125-128
infra.
Since both the Sixth and Second Circuits ruled in diversity cases, construing Tennessee
and New York law, respectively, it might be argued that the decisions are not in conflict.
Both cases, however, relied on essentially the same sparse body of law. On the second appeal
following issuance of a permanent injunction, the Second Circuit first considered the question of applicable state law. The Court agreed with defendant that Tennessee law should
apply, and in deference to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee law, ruled that the
right of publicity was not descendible after Presley's death. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., No. 80-7692 (2d Cir. June 29, 1981).
On the eve of publication of this article, a Tennessee state court ruled that the right of
publicity of Lester Flatt, a famous bluegrass musician, survived his death. Commerce Union
Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., No. 81-1252-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Oct. 2, 1981). The
court explicitly rejected the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee law and held that
the right of publicity is a property right distinct from the right of privacy. This opinion
casts doubt on the precedential value of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Factors.
Yet another example of a court viewing the right of publicity as a branch of the right of
privacy is Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Defendant used a photograph of plaintiff, a well-known professional basketball player, in connection with advertisements for beer. The judgment for defendant rested upon an interpretation of releases for the photograph signed by plaintiff. Id. at 408.

19811

Publicity and Privacy

An attempt to combine the personal and property right-theories
to the right of publicity was made by the California Supreme
Court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures."8 Suit was brought by the
heirs of the actor Bela Lugosi against the motion picture company
which produced the movie in which Bela Lugosi portrayed Count
Dracula. The defendant had acquired, by contract from Lugosi, the
right to use Lugosi's name and likeness in connection with the
movie. The defendant, however, also licensed Lugosi's likeness as
Count Dracula in connection with merchandise. 49 The plaintiffs
argued that Lugosi had a property interest in his name and likeness-which plaintiffs had inherited. Thus, they sought defendant's
profits from the merchandise licenses and an injunction against issuance of further licenses without their consent."
The court first considered the right of privacy cases where there
had been a refusal to find a cause of action asserting the privacy
rights of a dead person. 1 These cases were based on the rationale
that the right of privacy is a personal right which does not survive
death. 2 The court then stated, however, that determining the
"personal" or "property" nature of the right in question is "pointless." 3 The court concluded by straddling both positions, reasoning that while Lugosi, during his lifetime, could have created a
business or property interest in his name and likeness by selling
licenses, the decision whether to exploit his name and likeness was
a personal one." Since Lugosi did not license, assign, or otherwise
exploit his right of publicity, the court ruled that his heirs were not
entitled to exclusive use of Lugosi's name and likeness after his
death."6
A mixture of personal and property right theories also is reflected in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.s6 The plaintiff in
that case was a well-known sports personality nicknamed "Crazylegs" who objected to defendant's use of "Crazylegs" as a trade-

48. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
49. 603 P.2d at 427.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 430.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 431. The Court agreed with Prosser that the nature of the right is "pointless."
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 406 (1960).
54. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (1979).
55. The court suggested, however, that after Lugosi's death another party, like defendant, could adopt Lugosi's name or likeness, establish secondary meaning in it, and protect
it.
56. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
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mark for women's shaving gel. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that "the right of a person to be compensated for the use of
his name for advertising purposes or purposes of trade is distinct
from other privacy torts . .. [It] is different because it protects
primarily the property interest in the publicity value of one's
name."" Interestingly, the court did not conclude that the right of
publicity was derived independently of the right of privacy.5
Rather, the court merely decided that the right protected a property interest rather than a personal one.60
Summary
In each of the cases discussed above, the gist of the cause of
action was misappropriation of a name, likeness or performance.
By the time suit was filed, the person whose rights were asserted
had established public recognition of his name or likeness. These
were not unknown individuals thrust unwillingly into the public
glare, as in the usual right of privacy case. Rather, they had sought
and even generated public attention. These plaintiffs were not
seeking relief to prohibit all public use of their names and likenesses, but were attempting to prohibit only unauthorized public
use and to recover for misappropriation. In each case, the successful plaintiff was either in the business of publicly exploiting his
name, likeness or personal performance or had derived rights from
such a person. In effect, the defendant was claimed to have misappropriated a business opportunity of plaintiff.
The courts' decisions are best explained by their basic understanding of the right of publicity. When the right of publicity is
viewed as a "property" interest independent of the law of privacy,
the courts generally grant relief. When the right of publicity is
viewed as a branch or outgrowth of the law of privacy, the courts
either refuse to recognize the claim" or engraft the personal nature
57. Wisconsin had not previously recognized the right of privacy, and the trial court
dismissed the case partially on that basis. Id. at 130. In addition, the trial court concluded
that plaintiff failed to show prior use of "Crazylegs" as a trademark, and this fact defeated
plaintiff's trademark claim. Id.
58. 280 N.W.2d at 132.
59. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
60. Contra Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th
Cir. 1974), where the court failed to distinguish between the four forms of privacy and held
that the Nebraska Supreme Court's previous refusal to recognize a "false light" privacy action also barred an action governed by Nebraska law for misappropriation of one's name or
likeness, whether labeled a right of privacy or publicity.
61. It is believed that only Nebraska and Minnesota still do not recognize the right of
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of the privacy right onto the right of publicity, which often precludes relief. 2 The courts' decisions to grant or deny relief, therefore, have been strongly affected by their views on the distinction
between "personal" and "property" rights.
THE ILLINOIS EXAMPLE

The preceding discussion illustrates how some courts have
wrestled with the right of publicity. In jurisdictions where the right
of publicity has not yet been squarely confronted, two possible derivations of the right are available. Chances for enforcement of the
right seem best when the independent property origin of the right
is recognized. Chances for enforcement dim when the law of privacy is relied upon and the personal nature of the right is emphasized. To try to determine how each of the many jurisdictions that
have not dealt with the right of publicity would treat such a cause
of action is beyond the scope of this article. It may be helpful,
however, to examine how a typical jurisdiction that has not directly addressed the issue, Illinois, could characterize the right of
publicity and the implications of adopting the property or personal
right rationale. 3
The Property Basis in Illinois
Recognition of the right of publicity as a property right finds
support in Illinois law antedating recognition of the right of privacy. Illinois courts have long recognized the right of a person to
the exclusive benefit of his labor and skill." This right has been
privacy.
62. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979) is an
apparent exception to this observation.
63. Under existing Illinois case law, the question of whether a cause of action based on a
person's "right of publicity" exists independently of an action for invasion of privacy has
not been answered. Illinois courts have recognized that a cause of action exists for the appropriation of a person's name or likeness as an invasion of the right of privacy. Leopold v.
Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Carlson v. Dell Pub. Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209,
213 N.E.2d 39 (1965); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64
(1960); Annerino v. Dell Pub. Co., 17 11. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958); Eick v. Perk
Dog Food Co., 347 Il1. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952). No Illinois court, however, has dealt
with the issue of unauthorized exploitation of a public figure's personality for purely commercial purposes. Illinois has, however, also recognized the equitable principles of International News (see notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text) and its progeny. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Ill. App.
3d 820, 327 N.E.2d 247 (1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 30 Ill App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d
874, 167 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 484 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
64. Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 11. 608, 52 N.E.2d 924 (1898); Braceville Coal Co. v. Peo-
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characterized by some courts as "the highest form" of property
5
right.
Although no case has recognized this type of "property" in terms
of a right of publicity, one Illinois court has dealt with a closely
analogous issue that supports the recognition of the publicity right
as a property interest. In Pendleton v. Time, Inc.,66 the plaintiff
was the first artist to paint the portrait of Harry Truman. The portrait was presented to Truman, but the plaintiff retained all rights
to reproduce it. Subsequent to the unveiling and presentation of
the portrait, the plaintiff conducted unsuccessful negotiations with
several publishers, including defendant Time, for reproduction of
the portrait in a magazine of national circulation. Subsequent to
these negotiations, Time published, in Life magazine, a reproduction of a portrait of Harry Truman by another artist. A caption
accompanying the reproduction claimed that it was the first portrait painted of Truman.67
The plaintiff's complaint charged that Time's caption was made
with the intent to injure the plaintiff and destroy his reputation.
As a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff claimed that
the reproduction and sale rights of his portrait had been damaged
and that he had lost commissions to paint portraits of other prominent persons." The trial court granted Time's motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.69 The First District court reversed, noting that this was not an ordinary libel
case.7 0 Rather, the case involved injury to a property right of the
plaintiff derived from the publicity and reputation that he had

pie, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62 (1893); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill.
171, 31 N.E. 395 (1892); Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill.
App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949); Mowrey v. Mowrey, 328 Ill.
App.
92, 65 N.E.2d 234 (1946).
65. Mowrey v. Mowrey, 328 Ill. App. 92, 101, 65 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1946), where the court
stated that "the right to labor is a property right and that the property which every man
has in his own labor is the highest form of property." Such a right was recognized as early as
1898. In Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill.
608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898), the court declared:
Every man has a right under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will, and anyone
who invades that right without lawful cause of justification commits a legal wrong,
and, if followed by an injury caused in consequence thereof, the one whose right is
thus invaded has a legal ground of action for such wrong.
Id. at 615, 52 N.E. at 926.
66. 339 Ill.
App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1949).
67. Id. at 192, 89 N.E.2d at 437.
68. Id. at 193-94, 89 N.E.2d at 437-38.
69. Id. at 190, 89 N.E.2d at 436.
70. Id. at 196, 89 N.E.2d at 438-39.
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gained as a result of being the first artist to paint Truman's
71
portrait.
In Pendleton there was no claim for injury or damages as a result of mental anguish.72 The only injury alleged was to the artist's
reputation. The plaintiff's reputation had pecuniary value to him
and, perhaps, to purchasers of his works. The plaintiff was entitled
to benefit financially from his efforts free from interference by
others. Similarly, in a right of publicity case, a person who has established a famous personality through his or her skill and labor,
such as an athelete or a movie star, also is entitled to protect the
pecuniary value of that personality as a property right. The Pendleton case, therefore, provides support for the recognition by Illi73
nois courts of a right of publicity as a property right.

71.

We find in the allegations of this complaint a definite statement of property
right in the value attained in the painting of the 'first' portrait of Harry S. Truman,' the loss of potential income from reproduction and sale of rights of this portrait, as well as the loss of earnings from commissions to do portraits of other
prominent persons.
Id. at 194-195, 89 N.E.2d at 438.
The court based its decision on Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898), an
Illinois unfair competition case recognizing that a person has a property right in his or her
labor and skill, as well as upon similar cases from other jurisdictions. Dunshee v. Standard
Oil Co., 152 Iowa 276, 132 N.W. 371 (1911); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946
(1909); Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 51 N.Y.S. 2d 692 (1945), aff'd, 296
N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
72. In contrast, mental anguish is often claimed as an injury in right of privacy cases.
See notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
73. This type of property interest was also recognized in a different situation in Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970). There, the defendant
pirated plaintiff's phonograph records and magnetic tapes by duplicating them and selling
the copies. Although the musical performances were not copyrighted, the court, relying on
the principles of InternationalNews, found that the defendant had unlawfully appropriated
the plaintiff's property, which had been created as a result of the expenditure of labor, skill
and money. Id. at 434, 264 N.E.2d at 877.
The same equitable principles have also surfaced in common law trademark cases in Illinois. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.)
852 (N.D. Ill. 1980) the plaintiff, Universal, brought suit for trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition under federal and Illinois law. The complaint was based on
Ward's use of plaintiff's famous JAWS trademark on a line of garbage disposers. In holding
for the plaintiff, the court found that plaintiff's extensive promotional efforts and the wide
success of its two movies, JAWS and JAWS 2, had created merchandising properties in the
marks JAWS and JAWS 2. Id. 854-55. These marks were thus entitled to protection under
Illinois law against misappropriation by Ward. Id. at 858.
The essence of the cause of action in Universal, as with the right of publicity, was the
recognition of the pecuniary value in a name or trademark resulting from the great public
acceptance and fame of that mark after having been built up through the expenditure of
skill, labor and money. The court's reasoning is equally applicable to the right of publicity.
See also National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 211 Ill.
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The Privacy Basis in Illinois
Illinois right of privacy cases suggest an alternative basis for recognition of the right of publicity. The first case to recognize the
right of privacy in Illinois was Eick v. Perk Dog Food Company.7 4
In Eick, the defendant company used a photograph of the plaintiff,
a young girl not previously known to the public, without her consent in an advertisement promoting its dog food. The plaintiff
charged that her likeness was misappropriated and that publication of the photograph caused her humiliation and mental
anguish.7 5 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. 6
The First District appellate court reversed, finding overwhelming support for recognition of a right of privacy among decisions
from other jurisdictions and from numerous authorities." The
court explained that "recognition of the right to privacy means
that the law will take cognizance of an injury, even though no right
of property or contract may be involved and even though the damages resulting are exclusively those of mental anguish. ' 7 8 Despite
the fact that Eick did not involve a publicly known person, the
governing principle expressed by the court would be equally applicable to the right of publicity: "A person may not make an unauthorized appropriation of the personality of another, especially of
his name or likeness, without being liable to him for . . . damages
79
which the appropriation causes."
Although the right of privacy thus clearly provides a basis for
recognition of the right of publicity in Illinois, such recognition
would be coupled with limitations tied to the privacy rationale. On

App. 3d 814, 327 N.E.2d 242, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018.
74. 347 Ill.
App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
75. Id. at 294, 106 N.E.2d at 743.
76. Id.
77. The court cited cases from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missiouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, in addition to statutes from New
York, Utah and Virginia which recognize the right of privacy. The court also noted the
following articles as supporting its position: F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS, ch. 12
(1944); Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. R. 712 (1948);
Green, Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12
COLUM. L.R. 693 (1912); Nizer, Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941); Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 HASv. L. REV. 343, 362-64 (1915); Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); Winfield, Privacy, 47 LAW Q. REV. 23 (1931).
78. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293, 299, 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1952).
79. Id.
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the basis of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression, Illinois courts have repeatedly restricted assertion of the right
of privacy where matters of public interest are concerned.80 The
Illinois Supreme Court explored this area in Leopold v. Levin."'
There, the court indicated that the first amendment limitation applies not only where factual accounts of public events are reported
by newspapers and magazines, but also to fictionalized accounts of
matters in the public record.82 The plaintiff in that case, Nathan
Leopold, brought an action for violation of his right of privacy for
publication and distribution of a novel, a play, and a related motion picture, all of which were entitled "Compulsion."as These
works were based on the exploits of Leopold and Richard Loeb,
who together had gained wide notoriety as the convicted kidnappers and murderers of a young boy in 1924. As the court explained,
the crime "became an historical cause celebre."" Although neither
Leopold's nor Loeb's name appeared in the novel or movie, their
names were used in advertising to suggest that the novel and
movie were derived from the famous Leopold-Loeb murder case."
The court dismissed Leopold's contention that his right of privacy had been violated by the defendant's use of his name and
likeness in advertising to promote the novel and movie.86 The court
stated that the references to Leopold in the advertising concerned
a crime to which he had pleaded guilty as a matter of public
record. "That conduct [which admittedly constituted a crime] was
80. This includes any informational material of legitimate public interest and is not limited to items of news commonly reported in newpapers or magazines. For example, in Buzinski v. Do All Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1961) the court found that publication
of a picture of a mobile home in Popular Science Monthly magazine was a legitimate matter
of public interest and protected under the first amendment. See also Rozhon v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956); Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 230 F.
Supp. 721 (N.D.Ill. 1964); Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Beresky v.
Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978); Cassidy v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978); Carlson v. Dell Pub. Co., Inc.,
App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d
65 Ill.
331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960).
81. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
82. Id. at 439, 259 N.E.2d at 253.
83. Id. at 435-36, 259 N.E.2d at 252.
84. Id. at 436, 259 N.E.2d at 252.
85. Id. at 437, 259 N.E.2d at 253.
86. Id. Leopold also claimed that the novel and movie were so offensive as to outrage the
community's notions of decency. As such, Leopold argued that the defendants should not be
permitted to associate his name with the novel or the movie. The court rejected this contention noting that fictionalized aspects of the novel and movie had been drawn from and were
comparable to matters of public record and interest. Id. at 443, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
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without benefit of privacy. 8' 7 The court also emphasized Leopold's
status as a public figure. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co." was distinguished on the grounds that the complainant there was not a public figure and that her picture had been used to promote "a purely
commercial" product.8 9 This distinction suggests that when misappropriation of a name or likeness is alleged, the public or private
status of the plaintiff and the nature of the alleged misuse will be
carefully examined to determine whether a first amendment defense exists.
Another important limitation on the right of privacy in Illinois is
that no direct or derivative cause of action exists for invasion of
privacy after the death of the principal. 90 For example, in Carlson
v. Dell Publishing Company,91 a right of privacy action was
brought by the administrator and the children of a woman who
had been raped and murdered. The plaintiffs sought damages for
the publication of an article in the defendant's magazine about the
crime. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
affirmed, 92 holding that the administrator had no cause of action
for invasion of the decedent's right of privacy because the right is
personal and the claim at issue arose after death."
There is one Illinois case that has considered whether the appropriation of a public figure's name or likeness is based on the right
of privacy or an independent property right, but that case is limited by its unusual facts. In Maritote v. Desilu Productions,Inc.,"
the administratrix of Al Capone's estate, Capone's wife and his son
brought a diversity action in federal court in response to television

87. Id. at 444, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
88. 347 Il. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
89. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 444, 259 N.E.2d 250, 256 (1970). Similarly, the court in Bradley v.
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960), restricted the impact of
Eick: "Its holding is limited to its final conclusion - that a private person would be protected
against the use of his portrait for commercial advertising purposes." Id. at 333, 168 N.E.2d
at 65.
90. Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962); Maritote v. Desilu Productions,
Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D.Ill. 1964); Carlson v. Dell Pub. Co., Inc., 65 II. App. 2d 209, 213
N.E.2d 39 (1965); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64
(1960).
As used herein, the term "principal" refers to the person in whom the right of privacy or
publicity arises. The principal is generally the owner of the right unless there has been an
assignment or other transfer.
91. 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 213, 213 N.E.2d at 42.
94. 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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broadcasts by the defendant of "The Two-Part Drama-The Untouchables" and the weekly series "The Untouchables. '"96 The
plaintiffs sued in part on the basis of "quasi-contract", claiming
that defendants were unjustly enriched through the appropriation
of plaintiffs' property interest in Al Capone's name, likeness and
personality. 96 Capone's wife and son additionally sought recovery
for an alleged invasion of their own right of privacy,9 although
they were not publicized in the telecasts. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 98
Addressing the wife and son's privacy claim, the district court
held that Illinois law would not recognize the right of a decedent's
relatives to claim invasion of their right of privacy by publications
about the deceased. 9 Further, the court characterized the plaintiffs' quasi-contract theory as actually constituting a claim for misappropriation based on an invasion of privacy. 100 Such a claim similarly failed under Illinois right of privacy law because it did not
survive the death of Al Capone."'
Several significant facts limit any broad application of this case.
First, it is doubtful that Al Capone had any right of publicity in
his name and likeness as asserted by the plaintiffs. It can be assumed that Capone had never commercially exploited his personality while alive. Therefore, he never created any protectible property interest in his name or likeness that would survive his
death. 10 2 The court's apparent rejection of the "property right" la95. Id. at 722.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 725-26.
100. See text accompanying note 29 supra. The court explicitly rejected the argument
advanced by plaintiffs that the case involved an appropriation of a property right:
Plaintiffs have attempted to evade the personal nature of an invasion of privacy
suit, by attaching to it a new label, that of appropriation of a property right. Yet,

despite the label, such an action remains one for invasion of privacy, under Illinois
law, and must be subject to the restrictions imposed thereon.
230 F. Supp. at 723.
101. Id. at 724-25.
102. Al Capone's notoriety was generated as a result of his criminal activites. Thus, even
if Capone had commercially exploited his name and likeness during his life, it is questionable whether any court would recognize a protectible property interest in his personality.
Courts generally will not aid a wrongdoer seeking to take advantage of his own wrongs.
Diversey Corp. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 255 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1958); Plenderleith v. Gloss,
329 Ill.
283, 160 N.E.2d 745 (1928); Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill.
App. 3d 37, 390 N.E.2d 393 (1979); Metcalf v. Altenutter, 53 Ill.
App. 3d 904, 369 N.E.2d
498 (1977). One federal court denied relief where a bank robber claimed property rights in
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bel is, therefore, proper under the facts before it. Second, first
amendment considerations also limit the impact of the case. The
subject matter of defendant's television programs, even though
fictionalized, apparently was based on matters of public and historical record. 103 As such, the programs may be viewed as forms of
expression protected by the first amendment.'" Finally, the federal court expressly acknowledged that although a wrong had been
committed by defendants, it was bound to apply the law as formulated by the Illinois courts.105 Since no Illinois appellate court had
recognized the type of property right asserted by the plaintiffs, the
district court felt constrained against recognizing such a right.'"
The court found merit in the plaintiffs' arguments, but urged that
they be made in the state courts to enable Illinois to consider
whether to recognize such a right. 07
Summary
In sum, in Illinois a cause of action seeking relief for the unauthorized appropriation of a public figure's name or likeness could
be based either on (1) a property right, derived from unfair competition cases or (2) a personal right, derived from the law of privacy.108 If based on the right of privacy, the foregoing cases suggest
that the right of publicity would be subject to first amendment defenses and abatement of the cause of action upon death of the
principal. Such limitations probably would not be applicable to the
same extent if the right of publicity is viewed as an independent
property interest protectible under the theory of unfair competition. If the property theory is to succeed, the Maritote decision
suggests that a suit should be brought in a state court rather than
in a federal court. While no prediction can be made as to what
result the Illinois courts may reach when confronted with the right
of publicity issue, it is important to recognize the consequences
that may follow from a choice of one path over the other.
the publicizing of his crime. Miller v. American Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
103. 230 F. Supp. at 722.
104. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
105. 230 F. Supp. at 726.
106. Id. at 724-26.
107. Id. at 726.
108. These bases need not be mutually exclusive, however, as demonstrated by the Lugosi and Hirsch decisions. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
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COMPARISON OF THE RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN

MISAPPROPRIATION CASES

From the foregoing survey of the right of publicity in various
jurisdictions and the discussion of the possible bases for the right
in Illinois, it is apparent that misappropriation is the underlying
cause of. action whether this is considered under the rubric of the
right of publicity or the right of privacy. Both the right of publicity
and the right of privacy stem "from Court recognition that an individual has the right to control the use of his own name and image
and the publication of information about himself."'' 9 The question
naturally arises, however, as to which label, privacy or publicity,
should be applied to a cause of action, and whether it makes any
difference.
Two cases illustrate the point that a plaintiff may assert both
the right of privacy and the right of publicity in a cause of action
arising out of a single set of facts. In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.," 0
Muhammad Ali objected to a nude portrait of an unnamed boxer
published in Playgirl magazine. Ali claimed that this portrait was
unmistakably recognizable as himself and filed suit alleging violation of his rights of privacy and publicity."' The court found that,
in regard to Ali's statutory right of privacy under New York law,
Ali's status as a public personality did not foreclose application of
the right of privacy to prevent unauthorized commercialization of
his personality."12 Noting that Ali indisputably had "achieved in
some degree a celebrated status," the court also found that Ali's
right of publicity was violated.'1 3 Thus, the court concluded that
both the right of privacy and the right of publicity had been violated, and issued a preliminary injunction restraining further dis4
tribution of the pertinent issue of the magazine."
In a similar case, but with an opposite result, actress Ann-Margret sued to enjoin publication of a magazine which printed a pho-

109. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir.
1974).
110. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
111. Id. at 725.
112. Id. at 727. The court also found that the picture had been used for the "purpose of
trade" because it was "an illustration falling somewhere between representational art and
cartoon, and is accompanied by a plainly fictional and allegedly libelous bit of doggerel." Id.
at 727.
113. Id. at 729.
114. Id. at 732.
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tograph of her nude from the waist up. 115 Ann-Margret alleged violation of her rights of privacy and publicity. " ' The district court
noted that plaintiff is a "public figure" and that the photograph
was taken from a publicly displayed and authorized movie. " ,
These facts, coupled with the conclusion that the appearance of
Ann-Margret partially nude in a movie was a newsworthy event,
led to the finding that subsequent reproduction and publication of
her photograph in the magazine was not actionable under New
York's privacy law.11 8 For the same reasons, and with the additional factor that defendants' use did not constitute a use for advertising or trade purposes, the court also granted summary judgment against a claim for violation of the common law right of
publicity."'
These cases indicate that in certain situations both privacy and
publicity rights are present and should be asserted. Moreover, the
same factors may be determinative of both rights. The cases also
demonstrate that the right of privacy is not necessarily inconsistent with the right of publicity. There are a number of circumstances, however, in which both rights will not be available to a
plaintiff. These circumstances demand an understanding of the
differences between these rights and may require an election be1 20
tween the rights.
Death of the Principal
Privacy actions are categorized as actions wholly personal to the
principal, and usually a right of privacy action will be barred if the
cause of action arises after the death of the principal.1 2 1 It is unclear, however, whether death of the principal 1will
bar all actions
22
likeness.
or
name
of
misappropriation
on
based
115. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
116. Id. at 404.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 406. The court did not discuss Ali, but merely cited the case and in a parenthetical noted that it involved a drawing as opposed to a photograph, and was accompanied
by fictional and allegedly libellous language. Id. at 404.
119. Id. at 406.
120. Because Illinois is believed to be a typical state which has not yet recognized the
right of publicity, it is frequently used hereafter for illustrative purposes.
121. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
122. Suppose, for example, that a well-known person, John Jones, has been licensing use
of his name on merchandise for many years. When he dies, XYZ Corp. begins use of that
name on similar merchandise. A right of privacy action against XYZ Corp. would not be
available in Illinois to the administrator or executor of John Jones' estate. Assuming, however, that an action based on right of publicity would be available for a living John Jones,
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In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,"" the heirs of the comedians
Laurel and Hardy successfully asserted the right of publicity after
the comedians' death. The court, noting that other decisions have
labeled the right of publicity a property right, found "no logical
reason to terminate this right upon death of the person protected."12 ' Similarly, in Factors Etc., Inc. v.Pro Arts, Inc.," 5 the
assignee of the entertainer Elvis Presley successfully asserted the
right of publicity under New York law after Presley's death in obtaining a preliminary injunction. The court particularly emphasized the fact that Presley had exercised his right during his
lifetime.2 6
In contrast, the court in Memphis Development Foundationv.
FactorsEtc., Inc.,127 denied relief to Presley's assignee. This court
emphasized the personal nature of the right of publicity.2 8 The
court found that the principal social policy behind the right, encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity, would not 2be
9
promoted by recognizing the right after the individual's death.'
To predict the position of the courts of Illinois or other jurisdictions if faced with a similar claim would be sheer guesswork at
this point. Certainly, the holding of the Illinois federal court in
Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc.,180 indicates that under the
current state of Illinois law, the right of publicity would not survive. For an Illinois plaintiff to succeed in a case involving a deceased principal, it must be established that the right of publicity
has a distinct basis from the right of privacy. Further, the plaintiff
should emphasize the property nature of the right, and, if applicable, the fact that the right was assigned or at least used in some
way during the principal's life. Otherwise, the personal nature of
the right of privacy will
surely limit a claim for misappropriation
"
of a name or likeness.'
that action may or may not also be available after his death, depending on whether the
interest to be protected is viewed as a property or personal interest.
123. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
124. Id. at 844.
125. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
126. Id. at 216. See note 47 supra.
127. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
128. The court also discussed various problems with the right of publicity despite the
fact that no such problems existed in the case at issue. One problem noted, that of the scope
and duration of the right, is discussed at notes 132-144 infra and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 758-59.
130. 230 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
131. In McGill v. Lazzaro, 62 Ill. App. 3d 151, 379 N.E.2d 16 (1978), the court discussed
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Exercise and Duration of the Right
Another critical issue in several of the right of publicity cases
has been whether or not the principal had exercised his or her
right of publicity as of the time of suit.132 Exploitation or commer-

cialization of a person's name or likeness during the person's life
potentially has twofold significance: (1) it triggers the existence of
the right of publicity' and (2) in at least one jurisdiction,' 3 it
preserves the right upon the death of the principal.
In this respect, the right of publicity parallels the law of trademarks, by requiring use of the name or likeness by the principal in
order to become protectible. 1'3 At least one court has appeared to
carry the trademark analogy one step further. In dictum in Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures," the California Supreme Court stated that
upon Bela Lugosi's death, "anyone, related or unrelated to Lugosi,
.. .could, in [his or her] own name or in a fictitious name, or a
trade name coupled with that of Lugosi, have impressed a name so
selected with a secondary meaning and realized a profit."' 7 The
a two part test to determine the survival of a negligence action: (1) if the interest to be
protected was primarily a property interest, it survived; if the interest was primarily personal, it abated; and (2) if the right asserted is assignable, then it survives death. This test is
consistent with analyses applied in other jurisdictions to determine survival of the right of
publicity.
132. Courts have considered a paid performance, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), product or merchandise licenses, and assignments by the principal, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970), as examples of the exercise of the right of publicity.
Transfer upon death, however, is not sufficient to create the right. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
133. In all likelihood, Hugo Zacchini did not possess a right of publicity until he began
his "human cannonball" act for the public. The fact that the public paid to see his act
demonstrated that he had a proprietary interest in his act which a court could determine to
be protectible from appropriation by another. Similarly, entertainers such as Elvis Presley
and athletes such as Muhammad Ali have established rights of publicity through efforts
involving labor and skill.
134. The jurisdiction referred to is New York. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. "There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed." United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
Theoretically, any person, whether publicly known or not, could establish a right of publicity upon exercise of that right in a recognized manner. Public figures, however, obviously
have a greater "potential" for exercise than private figures not well known to the public,
because the names and likenesses of public figures are more likely to be marketable.
136. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
137. Id. at 822-23, 603 P.2d at 430 (1979)(emphasis added).
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court did not state whether this name "impressed with secondary
meaning" would be protectible as a trademark or as a right of publicity, but in many circumstances this distinction may be unimportant in terms of ultimate relief.138
Once the right of publicity exists, the duration of that right becomes a troublesome problem.13 9 The courts seem willing to accept,
and indeed assume, that the right of publicity extends at least for
the life of the principal. This assumption is probably justified in
most instances, because a name or likeness is inherently associated
with a particular individual and will remain identified with that
individual for his life.14 0 Assuming that the right survives the death
question is how long after death the
of the principal, the difficult
41
right should be extended.
One suggestion which has been made is that the right exist for
the same period as the term of a copyright (author's life plus fifty
years) on the basis that these are similar types of intangible property rights.1 42 This solution, although not altogether illogical, is not
the best resolution of the problem. First, the copyright term begins
with creation of the copyrighted work. In contrast, the right of
publicity comes into existence upon exploitation of the name or
likeness. Furthermore, the length of the copyright term originally
was selected to conform with copyright laws existing in a majority
of other countries. " s Similar considerations do not exist with respect to the right of publicity to mandate the adoption of a fiftyyear term. Finally, the copyright term defines a period of permis-

138. Under certain circumstances, however, this distinction may be very important. In
New York, for example, a grant of the right of publicity may validly be made "in gross" and
without an accompanying transfer of business or anything else. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to protect a name or likeness which was acquired without simutaneous transfer of a business interest would be best advised to rely on the right of publicity
rather than trademark rights, if possible.
139. The duration question was one of a "whole set of practical problems of judicial linedrawing," which influenced one court to hold that the right of publicity was not inheritable.
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
140. An exception to this rule may occur if the name or likeness asserted is not an individual's own name or likeness but rather, a nickname, a stage appearance, or the like. Compare John W. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, (E.D. Mich.
1980); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979); with
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
141. This problem does not arise with the right of privacy because that right lasts only
for the lifetime of an individual.
142. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 849, 603 P.2d 425, 446 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
143. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1976).
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sible monopoly which, when applied to the right of publicity, may
be unnecessarily long. Where, for example, the commercial value of
the right of publicity is derived not from labor and skill but,
rather, from fortuitous circumstances, 4 ' it seems neither fair nor
necessary to extend the right of publicity for the principal's life
plus fifty years.
A better solution to the problem is to limit the duration of the
right to the period of use or exploitation. Like a trademark, the
right of publicity stems from the initial use or exercise of the property right. 145 Protection of the right preserves the commercial interest in a name or a likeness. Therefore, protection of the right of
publicity should endure for the life of the principal and then, like a
trademark, cease when use of the name or likeness terminates. So
long as the property is exploited, it should be subject to the exclusive control of the principal or one whose rights are derived from
146
the principal.
This solution would avoid creating an unnecessarily lengthy monopoly of the right of publicity. Moreover, it has the advantage of
providing the courts with an existing common law trademark
precedent to serve as a guide in publicity cases, and for that reason
is more likely to meet with uniform acceptance in each of the
states. Finally, this solution would be consistent with those decisions requiring exercise of the right of publicity in order to transfer
or assign the right at death.
Defenses
Stating a cause of action under the rights of privacy or publicity
may raise different problems, but there are common defenses to
both claims. In addition to abatement due to death of the principal,1 41 these defenses include consent, first amendment protections
144. For example, the returned Iranian hostages probably have substantial potential to
exploit a right of publicity. The fame and the commercial value in their names and likenesses is not derived from their labor and skill. Until they use their names or likenesses
commercially, their rights of privacy remain available.
145. In many circumstances, the name or likeness may serve as a trademark and, in such
cases, should be protectible as a trademark as well as a right of publicity.
146. By analogy to trademark law, exploitation of the right of publicity would cease
when definite acts indicate the owner's intention to permanently give up use of the name or
likeness. Once exploitation ceases, trademark and first amendment principles would govern
situations where another adopts the name or likeness in connection with merchandise, the
media, or some other use. See J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:3
(1973).
147. See notes 120-131 supra and accompanying text.
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and statute of limitations.
The defense of consent is premised on the argument that the
plaintiff agreed to the use of his name or likeness. The issue most
likely to be disputed when this defense is raised is the scope of the
consent."1 8 For example, if a person agreed to "pose for a man that
takes a movie" and that movie is later shown on television in the
context of a commercial, a question of fact exists as to whether the
scope of the consent extended to the alleged misuse. 14 9 Similarly,

an agreement to transfer the right to use an actor's name and likeness in connection with the advertising of a motion picture may
not include the right to use that same name and likeness in connection with the sale of merchandise. 50 These are issues to be determined by the parties' intent and are not peculiar to either the
right of privacy or publicity.
A first amendment defense frequently appears in both right of
privacy and right of publicity cases. The defense is framed in
terms of the public's right to know, and focuses on the newsworthiness of the event or the status of the plaintiff as a public
figure.""1 The Supreme Court has indicated that a first amendment
defense may be less successful when raised against the right of
publicity than against the right of privacy. In Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward BroadcastingCo.,1 52 the Court concluded that different in-

terests warranted different analysis under the first amendment.153
The Court distinguished the plaintiff's proprietary interest in his
act as fundamentally different from an individual's interest in his
reputation and peace of mind, which is the essence of "false light"
privacy cases."5 4 While the Court recognized that the first amendment consistently has been held to protect media use of a name or
likeness in "false light" cases, the Court refused to apply that same
protection where the interest invaded constituted the plaintiff's
148.

PROSSER, supra note 29, at 804.
149. Smith v. WGN, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 183, 185, 197 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1964). See also
Dabbs v. Abbott Pub. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 438, 193 N.E.2d 876 (1963).
150. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
151. One article has suggested that the first amendment is the most important social
policy limiting both the rights of privacy and publicity. P. Felcher and E. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L. J. 1577, 1596 (1979).
152. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
153. Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports
that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the first and fourteenth
amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. Id. at 574-75.
154. Id. at 576.
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livelihood.
It may be argued that the Zacchini case is unique among right of
publicity cases because it involved misappropriation of a performer's entire act, not just his name or likeness. The Court's reasoning, however, is equally persuasive in the more common right of
publicity cases, where the plaintiff's name or likeness has been
misappropriated for a commercial use rather than for a news
broadcast. First Amendment protection traditionally has been
stronger when the media are involved than when strictly commercial interests are at stake.1"
Finally, another defense which commonly is raised in privacy
and publicity cases is that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. This defense is tied to characterization of the
interest to be protected. Statutes of limitations are commonly
framed in terms of "injury to feelings," i.e., slander and libel, versus "injury to property." In addition, because the interest to be
protected in privacy cases is generally similar to the interest in
defamation cases, many states have included actions for privacy,
slander and libel in the same statute of limitations.5" This limitation period is generally relatively short in comparison to other tort
and contract claims.1 57 The characterization of the interest, therefore, may be determinative of whether the action can be brought at
8
all.15

155. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the
court held that first amendment interests in defendant's movie outweighed plaintiff's right
of publicity.
156. But cf. Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953)(privacy action held to be covered by the longer general statute of limitations).
157. In Illinois, the applicable statute of limitations for privacy cases provides a period
of one year after the cause of action accrued. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, 114 (1979). The current
Illinois statute of limitations covering injury to property is five years after the cause of
action accrued. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, 16 (1979).
158. The importance of the property-privacy distinction is illustrated by the case of Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967). There, a critical issue was
whether the two year New Jersey statute of limitations covering "injury to the feelings" or
the six year statute for tortious injury to "property" was applicable to a case involving the
use of plaintiff's name and likeness for advertising purposes. Id. The court concluded that
the action was for invasion of property rights and not for injury to the person: therefore the
longer period was held to apply. Id. at 359, 325 A.2d at 80. In contrast, Maritote v. Desilu
Productions, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1964), refers to an unpublished decision of the
circuit court in Leopold v. Levin, No. 59 C 14087 (April 15, 1964), quoted in Maritote v.
Desilu Productions, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721, 729 (N.D.Ill. 1964). In Leopold, the court characterized the appropriation of a name and likeness for use in a novel, play, and movie as a
privacy action. Id. The action was thus covered by the short defamation statute of limitations. Id.
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In general, there appear to be only minimal differences in the
types of relief available in right to privacy and right of publicity
cases. The most common relief granted in right of privacy cases is
damages for mental anguish.159 The right of privacy preserves the
"right to be let alone," and the invasion of that right frequently
causes only mental distress. This does not mean, however, that the
defendant is not also liable for the "actual pecuniary damages
which the appropriation causes,"' 60 or for unjust enrichment. 16'
One court, in an apparent right of privacy case, made separate
awards for the value of a misappropriated endorsement, mental
and physical pain
and suffering, exemplary damages, and defen16
dant's profits.

2

The measure of damages in right of publicity cases usually is
plaintiff's lost value in the proprietary interest in his name or likeness, or the amount by which defendant has unjustly benefitted by
the misappropriation. Measuring damages depends upon how the
right of publicity has been exercised, and whether the defendant
has used the misappropriated right for profit. For example, where
the right has been exercised through an existing licensing program,
damages may be a reasonable royalty and/or payment of the defendant's profit.
In both privacy and publicity cases, injunctive relief also may be
available. The tort can be a continuing one and relief at law may
be difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the plaintiff in a right of publicity case, like his counterpart in a privacy case, may wish to be "let
alone", at least with respect to a particular defendant with whom
he does not wish to be associated. Also, punitive damages should
be available on the same basis as other torts, i.e., where wrongful
motive or state of mind is shown."a
The reason for overlap of available relief in privacy and publicity
cases is that usually the compensated injury is not only an injury
to feelings, but also represents a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or,
even more likely, a pecuniary gain to the defendant." 4 The inter-

159. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 I11. App. 293, 299, 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1952);
Annerino v. Dell Pub. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958).
160. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 I1. App. at 299, 106 N.E.2d at 745.
161. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 815.
162. National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
163. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 815.
164. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1970).
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ests to be protected in privacy and publicity cases are not inconsistent, and, consequently, the available forms of relief in such cases
will probably be the same regardless of whether the cause of action
asserted is based on privacy or publicity."as
CONCLUSION

While some commentators have urged a particular basis for the
right of publicity, the courts have not been uniform in recognizing
a single source of the right. In some instances, the courts appear to
have premised the right of publicity on more than one source. Consequently, there appears little chance in the near future for the
development of a uniform body of law on the right of publicity.
An understanding of the primary interests involved in privacy
and publicity cases may be the most helpful way to deal with this
area of the law and to explain the apparent inconsistencies in its
development. In many cases, privacy and publicity rights are both
present but are not separately defined. As a result, the reasoning of
the courts has been less than clear.
The confusion that prevails, however, is unnecessary. The rights
of privacy (the misappropriation category) and publicity should be
viewed as distinct but not mutually exclusive interests on a single
continuum of the cause of action for misappropriation of a name or
likeness. Before a person commercially exploits his or her personality, a personal interest exists in the control of his or her name and
likeness, which is entitled to protection against misappropriation.
165. One example of a plaintiff seeking to protect both his privacy and publicity interests is John W. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich.
1980). The entertainer Johnny Carson sued to prevent use of the term "Here's Johnny" in
connection with the sale or lease of portable toilets. The evidence showed that plaintiff had
used the term for many years to introduce his nationally televised program and had licensed
others to use the term as a trademark on clothing and toiletries. Id. at 76. Although the
court found that plaintiff had popularized the mark and that a substantial segment of the
public associated the mark with the plaintiff, the court held that "Here's Johnny" was not a
strong mark and was not entitled to protection against defendant's non-competitive use. Id.
at 77.
The court disposed of plaintiff's privacy and publicity claims by concluding that the term
at issue did not specifically identify plaintiff. Id. at 78. Nevertheless, the case is illustrative
of privacy and publicity interests present in the same plaintiff and in the same set of circumstances. See also text accompanying notes 110 and 115 supra. The indelicate nature of
defendant's product was obviously one which could be considered distasteful and embarrassing to plaintiff and to the ordinary sensibilities of a reasonable person, and probably
sufficient to justify an injunction. In addition plaintiff's established proprietary interest in
the term "Here's Johnny" was being used to defendant's advantage and was being diluted in
much the same way as a trademark is diluted when the mark is used by another without
authority. See note 73 supra.
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This interest is more properly labeled a right of privacy and is a
personal right which can be asserted only by the person subject to
an invasion of privacy. This right exists regardless of whether or
not the person is a so-called public figure. The publicity right
arises once a person has commercially exploited his or her name
and likeness. A legitimate property interest in the person's personality is created which is entitled to protection from unauthorized
appropriation and commercialization under the theory of unfair
competition. This right should endure for the person's lifetime and
thereafter until authorized exploitation of the name or likeness
ceases. Simply because a person has chosen to commercially exploit his personality does not mean he has forfeited his right of
privacy. Under certain circumstances, therefore, a plaintiff's assertion of both the right of publicity and right of privacy in the same
case may be entirely consistent. Perhaps the most that can be
hoped for in the near future as the "right of publicity" continues
to evolve is that the courts recognize the significance of the different interests to be protected in privacy and publicity cases, no
matter what label is applied to the cause of action.

